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Left and Right in the Economic Crisis 
 
 
Jonathan White 
 
Forthcoming, Journal of Political Ideologies 18 (2), 2013 
 
 
Two decades after the Cold War, the political traditions of Left and Right were widely deemed to have 
fossilised.  Many saw them as unable to express vital alternatives, and only distantly related to 
contemporary political life.  This article examines how far this remains true in the light of more recent 
upheavals.  It looks at the key divisions of opinion to have emerged from the 2008- economic crisis, 
identifying important differences concerning in what sense it a crisis (the production of disorder vs of 
injustice) and how it can be explained (acts of moral or intellectual transgression vs a pattern of adhesion 
to problematic doctrines and practices).  It goes on to argue these differences can be seen as extensions of 
older Left-Right dichotomies, albeit articulated with a second division between technical and normative 
reasoning.  The article concludes with a discussion of the challenge political actors face in positioning 
themselves coherently according to these divisions. 
 
 
 
Moments of political and socio-economic crisis are an interesting time to explore ideological 
change, being commonly the catalyst to a rupture in belief.
1
  Established ideas and alignments 
are placed in question, while new ones are apt to emerge.  One thinks historically of the 
fracturing of the Left after the Russian Revolution, or the emergence of the New Right 
following the 1970s oil shock – changes of deep significance for those who confronted these 
movements as well as for those who propelled them.  If we take the broadly pragmatist view 
that value differences emerge – certainly with most urgency – in response to problematic 
situations rather than as a steady stream of divergent opinion, the significance of crisis 
moments seems evident. 
How then can we map the political divisions which the 2008- Crisis – of the global 
economy, of the state, of the eurozone
2
 – has produced?  To what extent have important 
oppositions emerged, and insofar as they have, to what extent are they continuous with older 
patterns of the kind traditionally associated with Left and Right?  The present moment invites 
investigation of this kind, as a widely acknowledged rupture in the socio-economic frame.  The 
extent and nature of the political divisions it produces is a matter of added significance given 
recent decades have been widely, probably wrongly, diagnosed as showing evidence of 
ideological convergence.  Under such conditions, the terminology of Left and Right has been 
cast by many as moribund.
3
  A moment of crisis acts as a critical test then: is the decay of the 
old framework confirmed, or is it set to re-emerge in new colours?   
In what follows, taking Europe as my target of study, I argue the Crisis has indeed 
produced important dichotomies, centred on key questions to do with in what sense the 
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situation is actually a crisis and how one should understand its origins.  I propose a key 
distinction on each point: as regards the nature of the Crisis, between those who emphasise the 
disorder it engenders and those who emphasise its contribution to injustice, and as regards its 
origins, between those who emphasise acts of moral or intellectual transgression vs a long-
term pattern of adhesion to problematic doctrines and practices.  These dichotomies can be 
seen as extensions and reconfigurations of older Left-Right dichotomies, as I seek to show.  
Yet at the time of writing they remain focused on retrospective diagnosis rather than forward-
looking prescription, as we see when trying to identify meaningful differences as regards how 
the Crisis might be overcome.  To that extent they are somewhat flimsy ideological formations 
– half-formed, possibly transitional.   
As this summary indicates, my strategy is to seek to map the divisions the Crisis is 
producing and only then in a second step to examine whether these can be related to earlier 
distinctions conventionally regarded as of a Left-Right kind.  The aim is to establish whether 
one can plausibly arrive at a Left-Right dichotomy via a set of intermediary categories more 
intimately linked to the context in question.  An alternative approach, proceeding in reverse, 
would be to start from the assumption that ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ have an empirical referent in 
today’s world (identifiable e.g. by recourse to the self-definitions of political actors and the 
lineages of political thought) and move on to examine the impact of the Crisis on the 
configurations these terms describe (e.g. the changing fortunes of political parties).  There is an 
important methodological choice to be made here, and the prior approach seems superior in 
several ways.  First, it leads us to formulate an argument engaging directly with the sceptical 
position there are no meaningful Left-Right divisions today.  It requires us to examine what, if 
anything, forms the substance of political oppositions – to build them from the ground 
upwards, as it were, minimising the extent to which we simply infer them by extrapolating 
from times past. Second, it is well suited to the fact that political thinkers and actors in today’s 
world often avoid using the terms Left and Right.  If our task is to uncover oppositions which 
are not presented explicitly in Left-Right terms, it makes sense to avoid the premature 
application of this vocabulary.  Third, such an approach allows us to avoid suggesting the Left-
Right framework is exhaustive: we can examine whether there exist divisions of a Left-Right 
kind without feeling compelled to deny there may be others which are not of this kind, and 
which may require alternative schemes of representation.
4
 
Attempting this type of overview poses obvious challenges.  First, we are in the middle 
of a potentially transformative moment.  The meanings of Left-Right are likely to be unsettled, 
and we lack the historian’s perspective.  Second, even if we acknowledge our observations are 
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provisional, it may be impossible to tell a general story of Europe as a whole.  No doubt the 
dominant political oppositions vary across countries; but even within any given setting, they 
will be different for people of different political persuasion, for definitions are themselves a 
political matter.  So one should expect no consensus on these questions, and an account such as 
the following must be selective.  But these challenges should not deter us – indeed, there is a 
sense in which it is more feasible to attempt this type of general analysis in times of crisis than 
calm.  Crises are shaped by landmark events which produce common sets of reference-points 
for those who experience them, and which may thus lend structure to political disagreement.  It 
is in such moments, if at all, that it is valid to seek broad patterns in the contours of political 
division. 
 
 
Competing Diagnoses of the Crisis 
 
Situations of societal upheaval are, as we have noted, often the spur to the differentiation of 
political opinion.  At the most general level, one may connect this to the way a sense of crisis 
tends to produce a felt need for diagnosis and prescription.  Situations of disturbance call for 
the intervention of opinion: this idea is present in the medical origins of the concept of crisis, 
and persists in its social and political applications.
5
  That such opinion will appear in plural 
form is not given, at least in the short term: as the social psychologists tell us, under the 
pressure of novel events the phenomenon of ‘group-think’ – a heightened concern for 
consensus and mistrust of alternatives – may be accentuated.6  While typically associated with 
small, cohesive groups, it can characterise political communities as a whole in moments of 
great stress, e.g. in the early phases of war.  But over a period of time one can expect some 
kind of differentiation to follow, especially insofar as the crisis is held to persist. 
Once a situation has been defined as a crisis – a point on which there may be plenty of 
initial dispute – several concerns are likely to weigh on those involved.  I regard these as 
general to most crisis situations of the modern age – they are core issues on which opinion is 
very likely to form – though they will of course be supplemented by others in the particular 
instance.  We can express them in the form of three questions.  First, in what sense is it a 
crisis?  What is the nature of the problems it produces or reveals?   Second, what caused the 
crisis?  Were there deep causes in play, or was it the outcome of more contingent factors?  
Third, can the crisis be overcome, and if so, how?  Clearly, not all who are party to the 
situation may feel equally pressed to find answers to these questions: some may avoid an 
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analysis of causes lest it implicate them as bearing responsibility, while others may have 
something to gain from the crisis and feel no desire to seek solutions.  But in public discourse 
as a whole, these are questions which are likely to recur, and narratives responding to them can 
be expected.
7
 
We can use these basic questions to identify a number of salient positions in today’s 
Europe in response to the present Crisis.  I shall give prominence to the first two questions, as 
responses to them are currently the most stable and developed, though I shall integrate 
elements of the third, to do with the possibilities for overcoming the Crisis, as we proceed.  For 
clarity of expression I sketch these positions first as ideal types, before linking them to 
particular voices and ideological traditions.  These types are developed on the basis of 
intuition, reflection and empirical observation – an impressionistic approach, but one justifiable 
given the aim is not to present the reader with unfamiliar information but to provide an 
organising framework for ideas which are omnipresent at the time of writing.  The relevant 
evidence will be mainly ideational – concepts, narratives, embedded assumptions – but as 
promoted by visible actors, be they political parties, social movements or individual opinion 
leaders, as opposed to as theoretical possibilities.
8
  Perhaps empirical developments alone will 
never be sufficient to settle questions to do with the durability of Left and Right: there is an 
inescapably political dimension to moves to affirm or deny their persistence, and we are 
dealing ultimately in the currency of claim and counter-claim.
9
  But even so, there is value in 
examining what backing such claims can invoke. 
To introduce the main contours of our discussion: concerning the first question – in 
what sense is the Crisis a crisis? – we see two principal lines of response.  The first holds that it 
is a crisis in the sense that it produces disorder.  It entails the malfunctioning of a system, 
generally understood to be an economic one.  Such arguments tend to cast the problem in terms 
of volatility, inefficiency, unpredictability, and in the extreme case disintegration.  These 
accounts need not be limited to economic behaviour – political forms of unrest such as protests 
and rioting may equally be in view – and they need not overlook matters of human suffering, 
but the emphasis is consistently on how such developments produce instability.  The solutions 
sought have a technical character, often presented as value-neutral or oriented to values which 
do not need explicit elaboration.  By contrast, a second line of reasoning holds that the Crisis is 
a crisis in the sense that it produces injustice.  It entails outcomes deemed normatively rather 
than functionally (or merely emotionally) unacceptable – outcomes which, for reasons of 
principle, need to be corrected or at least given some kind of ethical justification.  In this view, 
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issues of right and wrong are at stake.  As we shall see, a variety of voices in today’s Europe 
can be associated with both these positions on the essence of the Crisis.
10
 
As regards the second question – what caused the Crisis? – again we can identify two 
main positions.  The first locates its origins in the failings of specific actors – essentially, in 
bad decisions.  In one form or another, it is a critique of transgression, be it the violation of 
good judgement, reason, or moral norms.  Coupled with a concern for disorder, it may be 
phrased as a critique of competence – e.g. the competence of financiers, central bankers, 
government officials, decision-makers in international institutions, and public commentators.  
When coupled with a concern for injustice, it may be phrased as a critique of moral conduct – 
e.g. of the greed and irresponsibility of certain sectors of society, the corruption and self-
interest of politicians, or a more general dislocation of elites from popular moral codes and 
everyday concerns.  Either way, one sees criticisms addressed to a wide range of actors of state 
and economy for having deviated from that which is expected of them.  The second line of 
thinking, in contrast to a focus on transgression, locates the origins of the Crisis in conformity 
to a wider set of practices which are themselves problematic.  It is the pattern, not the deviation 
from it, which is the source of misadventure.  A critique of adhesion thus forms the basis of 
such accounts.  As that to which adhesion is displayed, these narratives generally evoke a 
combination of material structures, the incentives they produce, and the ideas underpinning 
them.  Concepts such as the market, capitalism and neoliberalism tend to figure prominently.  
Coupled with a concern for disorder, one can expect arguments of the kind that the market has 
internal contradictions, necessitating sustained intervention to avoid breakdown or the search 
for alternative economic models.  Coupled with a concern for injustice, the focus is likely to be 
on unfair distributions of resources, forms of domination and exploitation by the powerful, and 
the alienating effects of commodification and market competition. 
With these distinctions we are able to conceive, in abstract form, four strands of opinion 
concerning diagnosis of the Crisis, expressed in tabular form below.  They are not quite 
mutually exclusive – one can hold that the Crisis produces injustice and disorder at the same 
time, and has its origins in some combination of transgression and adhesion – but they entail 
quite distinct points of emphasis and hybrid positions are likely to show tensions. 
 
 
 
                              What caused 
                                   the Crisis?  
What  
makes it a Crisis? 
 
ADHESION 
 
TRANSGRESSION 
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DISORDER 
 
 
(3)  
 
 
(1)  
 
 
 
 
INJUSTICE 
 
 
(4)  
 
(2)  
 
 
Let us now examine these positions in turn, looking more closely at the patterns of argument 
associated with them and the actors around whom they cluster.   
 
 
Four Strands of Opinion on the Crisis 
 
(1) Disorder / Transgression 
This can be regarded as the minimal account of the Crisis, in that it both eschews explicit 
evaluations of principle and locates the origins in contingent mistakes rather than structural 
imperatives and systematic error.  It is the least critical of the status quo.  The Crisis is 
presented essentially as a period of turbulence, something to ride out and perhaps to learn 
lessons from, but largely a self-contained event rather than one revealing the failure of a 
template.
11
  ‘Recovery’ is the outcome desired.  The restoration of order is ultimately about 
the restoration of confidence that certain transgressions will not be repeated.  Technical 
rather than ethical questions are to the fore, and the language used is likewise technical, 
raising questions we shall return to concerning the intended audience.   
A leading version of the argument locates the core of the Crisis in high public and 
private debt, and the difficulty of pricing this debt.  The attendant market uncertainty and 
unpredictability are said to inhibit risk assessment and the calculation of returns on 
investment, producing system volatility as sentiment swings sharply between ‘exuberance’ 
and caution.
12
  Concerning the origins of this predicament, a central place is given to 
macro-economic mismanagement.  Excessive public spending is highlighted.
13
  The finger 
is pointed at governments across Europe, notably at previous incumbents, but especially at 
key countries of the eurozone periphery – Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland.  In 
some cases, notions of bad house-keeping mix with intimations of corruption and tax 
evasion – a second form of transgression.  Public regulators, including international 
regulators, may be accused of failing – or not being allowed – to do their job properly, 
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enabling dubious practices to continue.
14
  Transgressions in the private sector may also be 
noted, particularly in the fields of banking and credit rating.
15
  However, given such 
accounts do not impugn the fundamentals of the system, they tend to be advanced by those 
sympathetic to the monetarist and private-sector-oriented economic model generally 
considered ascendant on the eve of the Crisis.  Their critics tend to refer to them as 
‘neoliberals’: the label is useful, but it should be noted that only sometimes are we dealing 
with unqualified advocacy of free-market economics.  Often the hostility towards state 
intervention is more selective and domain-specific than the purist would demand.
16
 
This diagnosis of the Crisis has been fairly dominant in Europe’s political 
institutions, notwithstanding the local variations a more microscopic investigation would 
reveal.  It has been articulated by governing party elites, officials of the European 
Commission, International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank, as well as by 
many opposition parties.  In treating the Crisis as the consequence of mismanagement, ill-
discipline and imprudence, the suggestion is that the pre-Crisis order was not inherently 
unstable, but rather that it is in need of perfecting. 
As far as policy-making prescription goes, if over-spending and dubious investing 
was the cause of the Crisis, this is where reforms must be targeted.  The reduction of public 
spending is prescribed, with the centre-piece of these efforts being the ‘austerity’ 
programmes of balancing state budgets through cuts in expenditure, especially in the 
‘unproductive’ field of social welfare.  A crucial element in these moves is the effort to 
restrict the agency of those deemed to have provoked the Crisis: this means a degree of 
banking sector reform, but in particular the limiting of policy options available to eurozone 
governments – hence the ‘debt brake’ spending restraints introduced with the 2012 Fiscal 
Compact.  Reassuring major investors of the soundness of public finances and states’ 
capacity to bear existing debts is presented as necessary for the restoration of system 
stability.  Although the diagnosis of the Crisis is minimal in the sense indicated, it may 
nonetheless lead to quite radical calls for change – albeit conceived as reforming the pre-
existing model rather than revoking it.  It is change as intensification rather than 
substitution.  Concerns to do with efficiency trump those to do with justice, and the moral 
condemnation of market outcomes is likely to be deemed superfluous given it supposes 
alternatives which do not exist.  Though one finds some important variations – notably 
concerning how determinedly to pursue low inflation – generally it is technical reforms for 
the sake of greater system stability which are sought.   
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(2) Injustice / Transgression 
This position resembles the previous in its focus on mistakes: it locates the origins of the 
problem in human transgression rather than in the demands of an anonymous system.  It is 
generally sympathetic to the market in its undistorted form.  But it pairs this stance with a 
more ethically involved perspective.   
One of the prime expressions of this view has been amongst thinkers generally 
characterised as communitarian-conservative (or ‘one-nation’ conservative), as found in the 
media and to some degree party politics.  A clear instance was a July 2011 newspaper 
article by the British conservative journalist Charles Moore, widely disseminated in Britain 
and beyond.
17.  Under the title ‘I’m starting to think that the Left might actually be right’, 
Moore argued ‘that a system purporting to advance the many has been perverted in order to 
enrich the few.’  Moral outrage, in contrast to a merely technical concern to restore order, is 
characteristic of this piece and the many like-minded interventions which followed.
18
  A 
widespread ‘demoralisation’ or ‘moral disintegration’ are at the heart of the Crisis for these 
conservative thinkers – be it the behaviour and morality of those at ‘the bottom’, who have 
lived beyond their means or who break the law, or those at ‘the top’ such as bankers and 
politicians, beset by greed or vainglory.
19
  There is a concern to foreground the interests of 
‘society’, as distinct from the interests of the market actor or the state.20 
Similar ideas have been prominent around Europe: in Germany, a largely sympathetic 
follow-up piece was published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung quoting Moore’s title 
as its own.
21
  Rather than seek to defend the policies of Europe’s ruling elites, the author 
calls for a renewed ‘bourgeois’ critique of unrestrained markets.  It is the middle classes 
who are to be valorised, in contradistinction to the wealthy beneficiaries of austerity.  
Similar sentiments can be found in the Christian Democratic tradition, notably as 
articulated by a prominent member of the German CDU (Erwin Teufel) who, like Moore, 
urges the need to reconnect with the everyday concerns of the majority.
22
  The necessary 
remoralisation of the party’s politics takes religious form: it involves rediscovering the ‘C’ 
in the CDU.
23
  Again, sympathetic newspaper and blog commentaries have followed.
24
  
While these communitarian arguments display local variations, they are clearly distinct 
from our previous category.  The distance from the broadly neoliberal position seems clear: 
it is the difference between a Thatcherite ‘greed is good’ and a moralising ‘greed is bad’.    
Such arguments have not been restricted to conservative commentators and 
politicians.  Similar views are to be found in some social-democratic parties.  Variations on 
them are also evident in what are typically referred to as far-right populist parties.  Such 
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parties build support by drawing a sharp divide between cultural out-groups and a favoured 
in-group, casting themselves as the last hope of the latter.  The Party for Freedom in the 
Netherlands, the Vlaams Belang in Belgium, the Front National in France, or Jobbik in 
Hungary, are notable examples, like the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List before them.
25
  In recent 
years they have tended to define themselves principally not on economic questions but on 
issues of cultural identity and values, e.g. the place of Islam in western societies: today they 
are coupling their culturalist message with an economic narrative addressed to the origins 
and consequences of the Crisis.  They fit the category under discussion well because their 
message involves moral outrage directed at specific actors – corrupted elites, internal or 
external ‘peoples’ which pose a threat to ‘us’ (cf. Bild Zeitung’s notorious portrayals of 
Greeks) – without this extending to a fundamental critique of a system.26  Their target 
remains transgression.   
Do common prescriptions emerge from this assembly of voices?  In general one sees 
a desire for what might be called ‘capitalism with a human face’.  There are calls for 
restraints on finance capital, the promotion of small business, and emphasis on 
responsibility and just rewards.  In British Conservative leader David Cameron’s words, it 
is a vision of ‘moral capitalism’, guided by the maxim that ‘we should use this crisis of 
capitalism to improve markets, not undermine them’.27  In many accounts one senses a 
longing for the more homely market of Adam Smith’s butcher, brewer and baker, a world 
of strong community ties.  There are calls to prevent future transgressions (e.g. with new 
banking regulations) and to hold those responsible for past ones to account (e.g. by jailing 
individuals
28
).  Distrust of the globalised economy frequently mixes here with scepticism 
towards the euro and the European Union, presented by many as political folly.  Where 
European integration is not opposed outright, there may be calls to shrink the extension of 
‘Europe’ to a core of the morally upstanding – that is, the economically prudent.   
 
(3) Disorder / Adhesion 
This category is populated by those who see the Crisis in mainly technical rather than 
normative terms – focusing in the first instance on its implications for the functioning of a 
system – and yet who see the origins of the turbulence as deeper than mere transgression.  
In a variety of ways, it is argued that the Crisis arose from adhesion to a faulty framework, 
be this active commitment to an erroneous economic doctrine, acquiescence in the build-up 
of structural imbalances, or conformity – perhaps scarcely willed – to a set of fundamental, 
socio-economic ‘laws’.  Many such perspectives have something of a minority, ivory-tower 
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quality – too critical for policy-makers, who are likely to see themselves as working within 
narrower constraints, yet too dry for mass appeal.  But though their natural constituency 
may be small, they are an intellectually substantial array. 
One such line of thought is to be found amongst demand-side economists, for whom 
the Crisis is a reflection of major imbalances in the economy and the distorted rationality 
that encouraged them to emerge.    Key points in such an argument may include the long-
term weakening of organised labour; the decline of Europe’s manufacturing base; a 
deepening imbalance in levels of industrialisation between the continental core and 
periphery; a related imbalance in trading power; increasing socio-economic inequalities; 
the growth of private debt; excessive faith in market deregulation; an uncritical outlook on 
the financial sector; and a persistent orientation towards ‘neo-mercantilist’ competition 
policy.  Rather than castigating individuals and countries for taking on debt, this 
perspective emphasises the incentives which led them to do so, perhaps even the functional 
necessity for the system of their having done so in order to prop up demand and thus delay 
the impending crisis.  Such acts are treated as symptomatic rather than transgressive.  They 
are indicative of a wider regime, as use of terms such as ‘privatised Keynesianism’29 
implies.  A rich contemporary articulation of such arguments on a European scale can be 
found in the writings of the EuroMemorandum group of economists.
30
  As noted, the 
critiques expressed are far-reaching, but generally of a technical kind: while ‘social justice’ 
features in the subtitle of a key publication, the focus is generally on questions of 
functionality rather than the values in play.   
The work of contemporary Marxist economists also deserves mention, as voiced at 
various public workshops and forums.
31
  Some share with the aforementioned an analysis 
of the Crisis centred on the rise of finance capitalism, increasing inequalities, low demand, 
and the unsustainable credit mechanisms designed to cope with these tendencies.
32
  Others 
focus rather on the implications of technological change and a decline in profitability.
33
  
Common to them, and in sharp contradistinction to our previous two categories, is the 
emphasis on long-term trends and associated patterns of behaviour as the generators of the 
Crisis.  Again, these Marxist accounts are quite technical: normative concerns surely 
underlie them, but are not the focus of analysis, and insofar as some texts show a tendency 
towards historical determinism, normative questions become epiphenomenal.   
Not all such diagnoses of the Crisis yield policy prescriptions: some address the likely 
future trajectories of the economic system in a quite structuralist fashion, with only rather 
general remarks on human agency and technological innovation.
34
  But several more 
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immediate proposals can be heard: as ‘programmes that address fundamental structural 
problems of capitalism today’, the Euromemorandum group calls for public investment 
(nationally and through the European Investment Bank), banking reform, taxes on wealth 
and financial transactions, a coordinated wage policy, industrial policy aimed at developing 
the European periphery, a reduction in working hours, the creation of a publicly-owned 
ratings agency, and other moves away from free-market economics and the associated 
emphasis on competitiveness, deregulation and privatisation.
35
  Calls for minimum wages 
(national or global), a basic income for all citizens, and the reduction of dependence on 
fossil fuels (cf. the ‘Green New Deal’) are also to be heard.36  They are technical remedies, 
not packaged for ease of public consumption.   
 
(4) Injustice / Adhesion  
The final category combines far-reaching accounts of the origins of the Crisis, centred on 
macro-level patterns rather than contingent choices, with attention to its normative 
implications.  These views come in a variety of forms – sometimes centred on a critique of 
the market, finance and big business while the role of the state is discounted or celebrated; 
sometimes including a critique of the state as reproducing wider power relations.  Such 
differences echo older divisions between socialists and anarchists.  While there is some 
affinity with category (3), these strands are distinct from those previously examined. 
Socialist and social-democratic parties, as well as social movements, are the key 
places where such arguments may be found (in many cases in parallel with elements of 
position (1) and (2)).  Ed Miliband, leader of the British Labour Party, provides a flavour in 
his speech to the 2011 Labour Party Conference.  He talks of ‘the failure of a system’, of 
‘an economy and a society too often rewarding not the right people with the right values, 
but the wrong people with the wrong values.’  It is a critique of the incentive structure and 
the injustices it has spawned.  ‘Good times did not mean we had a good economic system.  
We changed the fabric of our country but we did not do enough to change the values of our 
economy.’  He explicitly rejects moves by the Conservatives to blame contemporary crises 
(including the August 2011 riots as well as economic decline) merely on lax moral 
standards:  ‘I’m not with the Prime Minister [Cameron]. I will never write off whole parts 
of our country by calling them sick. We are not a country of bad people but great people.  
[…] But with such great people, how have we ended up with the problems we face? It’s 
because of the way we have chosen to run our country.  Not just for a year or so but for 
decades.’  Long-term adhesion to mistaken practices lies at the heart of the Crisis.  Such a 
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perspective is not wholly structuralist – blame can still be apportioned to those who had the 
power to reproduce or abandon these practices (hence emblematic villains in the political 
and financial world may be evoked) – but individual actions are systematically located in a 
larger pattern of behaviour. 
This type of deep-running analysis of the Crisis remains relatively rare in the 
parliamentary parties of Europe, though it has become pronounced in certain countries – 
notably in Greece amongst anti-austerity parties like Syriza, also in France with the 
appearance of Mélenchon’s Left Front and in the Netherlands in the shape of Roemer’s 
Socialist Party.  It has been a familiar feature of social movements for some time, 
particularly amongst the alter-globalist movements of the late 1990s.  If there is novelty to 
be found in the period since the Crisis broke, it is in the renewed intensity of such critiques 
and the renewed emphasis on economic forms of injustice.  While these were never absent 
in recent decades, they were somewhat marginalised by internal debates and by landmark 
events such as September 11
th
 2001.  One sees their resurgence in the resistances to the 
austerity programme, especially in the countries of southern Europe (the indignados in 
Spain, the aganaktismenoi in Greece) but also in the Occupy movements more generally.  
Interestingly, such ideas even appear to have currency in post-communist Europe, as 
indicated for instance by protests in the Czech Republic in April 2012.
37
  
In terms of prescription, these perspectives tend to be associated with calls for far-
reaching structural change not unlike those outlined under category (3).  The systematic 
redistribution of wealth and productive resources is a prominent goal, as many of the 
Occupy movements have called for.
38
  The austerity policies promoted by and through the 
EU are opposed, even if the principle of European policy-making may be endorsed.  If 
there is an additional element distinctive from category 3, it lies in an emphasis on political 
participation and democratic decision-making.  One sees calls for the extension of 
democratic practices into spheres of life where they are currently weak or excluded (e.g. 
the workplace, institutions of macro-economic management), alongside the development of 
cooperative rather than competitive economic structures.  Fighting injustice is presented as 
a project to be pursued through inclusion and mobilisation.  Notions of ‘civil society’ may 
be invoked here, bearing a certain resemblance to ideas we have discussed under heading 
(2). 
 
Four families of opinion emerging in response to the Crisis have been described in this section, 
and can be entered into our table as below. 
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                       What caused 
                                  Crisis? 
What  
makes it a crisis? 
 
ADHESION 
 
TRANSGRESSION 
 
 
 
DISORDER 
(3)  
Closest ideological traditions: 
demand-side liberal economics; 
contemporary Marxist economics 
 
Articulated by: critical economists 
(1)  
Closest ideological traditions: 
supply-side liberal economics 
(neoliberalism and its variants) 
 
Articulated by: ECB, IMF, EU 
Commission, ruling-party elites 
 
 
 
 
 
INJUSTICE 
(4)  
Closest ideological traditions: 
Socialism; New Left; 
Environmentalism 
 
Articulated by: Social-Democratic 
party factions, socialist parties, Green 
parties, social movements 
 
(2)  
Closest ideological traditions: 
Conservatism;  Christian Democracy, 
Social Democracy (some strands); 
nationalist populism 
 
Articulated by: opposition parties, 
ruling-party factions, popular media 
 
 
 
Evidently this type of ordering suppresses some potentially important distinctions 
within each category.  One might be troubled for instance by the pairing of Marxist approaches 
with economics of a Keynesian variety.  One might query the proximity of Conservative and 
Social-Democratic views, at least given their diversity of lineage.  There are two points to bear 
in mind, however.  First, these clusters should be treated as contextual in character: they are 
readings of a particular set of historical events.  In such moments the divergences may be less 
significant than the commonalities, especially where a quite different set of views is 
hegemonic.  Second, within each of the strands of opinion identified, it may be possible to 
make internal differentiations by reintroducing the same set of distinctions at a new level of 
analysis.  Thus one might seek to separate, within the Disorder / Adhesion category, positions 
which are especially technical from those with display normative elements, and positions 
which are strongly structuralist from those focused on problematic turns in economic thought 
and which thus reimport notions of transgression, albeit on a different scale from category (1).  
There is, in other words, a fractal-like quality to these distinctions, and they should not be 
thought of in absolutist terms.
39
 
 
 
A Left-Right Divide? 
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The perspectives we have described are contextually defined, shaped by the diagnostic 
questions the Crisis presents.  They express the opinions of a particular moment.  Let us now 
return to a point we began with – whether such positions can be seen as continuous with older 
Left-Right divisions.  Although there can perhaps be no definitive answer to such a question – 
the historical contours of Left and Right are a matter of some disagreement, as is the 
application of historical categories to the present
40
 – still one can venture the argument that our 
table does capture Left-Right divisions, with the left-hand boxes broadly corresponding with 
familiar positions of the Left and the right-hand boxes with those of the Right.   
Before developing this point, let us recall some of the debates concerning the structure 
of the Left-Right opposition.  There have been a number of celebrated intellectual efforts to 
identify a cross-temporal core to it.  One of the most promising sees it as centred on the level 
of commitment to rectifying inequality, with the Left defined by its inclination to seek this and 
the Right by its scepticism towards such efforts, either on grounds of feasibility or 
desirability.
41
  Empirical research suggests the Left-Right distinction is often interpreted by lay 
citizens in terms of diverging attitudes towards the institutions of state and market.
42
  Attitudes 
towards historical change – i.e. stability vs progress – are another familiar rendition of the 
distinction.  Here I do not wish to isolate one of these dichotomies as the enduring core, since 
the key question for our purposes is not whether each expression of Left and Right can be 
subsumed under a single categorical distinction, but whether they display elements of 
continuity sufficient for us to treat them as integrated traditions.  If we borrow Wittgenstein’s 
idea of family resemblance, we are likely to answer in the affirmative.  Whether or not there is 
a single element which all conceptions of Left and Right share, we can say that all recognisable 
conceptions include elements which others share (particularly those most proximate in time 
and space), sufficient for us to speak of Left-Right traditions.
43
  I will proceed from the view 
that the Left-Right distinction has very often had something to do with attitudes to the 
rectification of inequality and – as a related but not derivative point – attitudes to the market; 
the ensuing divisions have, however, generally been interlaced with other distinctions, 
narratives and clusters of concepts in different periods and places, as fostered by the specifics 
of historical experience and debate, such that one must speak of Lefts and Rights in the 
plural.
44
 
If we take this view of the Left-Right opposition, it seems possible to treat the 
diagnoses of the nature and origins of the Crisis we have described as intelligible in Left-Right 
terms.  Box 1 in the table (Disorder / Transgression) can be treated as a position of the Right 
insofar as it makes a minimal critique of the market and has very little to say on matters of 
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inequality.  Its diagnosis of the Crisis locates it mainly in human error, suggesting that equality 
of distribution, as a structural property, is accorded no major role in the functionality of the 
system.  Likewise it is accorded no normative worth, for this is an account addressed to 
problems of disorder: indeed, one of the appealing qualities of the well-functioning market for 
adherents of this perspective may lie precisely in the possibilities for substituting exchange 
relations for ethical deliberation.  More generally, an account centred on transgression tends 
towards underwriting the order whose standards it claims have been violated.  To be sure, it 
may well idealise those standards, exaggerating the extent to which they were ever in force – it 
is often said that neoliberal rhetoric precedes the reality by some distance.
45
  But through its 
denunciation of transgression, it reveals the ideal to which it is committed.  We shall say more 
on the politics of ‘austerity’ in a moment.  It may furthermore be noted that, if this was the 
main discourse of European policy-makers in the years following the outbreak of the Crisis, it 
coincided with the ascendancy of political parties conventionally identified as of the Right.
46
   
Box 2 in the table (Injustice / Transgression) can again be associated with a fairly 
sympathetic view of the market and a quite limited concern with inequality.  Many nationalist-
populist parties of the current period focus their moral outrage on unjust rewards – e.g. the fact 
of supposedly lazy and crooked southern Europeans raiding the wealth of the hard-working 
northern taxpayer.  Such narratives generally do not include calls for a more equal distribution 
of wealth – even where state intervention is advocated – for they are premised on the idea that 
people are not natural equals (that they divide between the honest hard-workers and the 
dishonest free-riders): the call is for the distribution of wealth to better reflect that fact.  As 
such these may be regarded as positions of the Right.  Things are a little more complex when 
we turn to the communitarian-conservative strands of opinion as discussed, since here one does 
see some kind of critique of inequality and of existing market practices.  There is a clear effort 
to take distance from the pre-Crisis order, and an acceptance that the consequences of the 
Crisis are scarcely to be given normative defence.  But it remains a critique of excesses of 
inequality and of the perversion of the market.  To suggest a system has been ‘perverted’, as 
one hears Moore do, is to imply the distortion of something which in its natural state remains 
wholesome.  While the largest inequalities are treated as unacceptable, it is emphasised that 
these have been generated contingently by inappropriate behaviour – the greed of financiers 
and the ‘super-rich’, the laziness of the able unemployed, the profligacy or corruption of 
politicians (at home or in the European South), or the carelessness of regulators.  Such 
behaviour is not merely symptomatic of the system but constitutes a culpable choice.  The 
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benefits of the well-functioning market and of ‘non-excessive’ inequality in cultivating 
individual responsibility are affirmed.  The position remains recognisably one of the Right. 
Box 3 in the table (Disorder / Adhesion) captures a perspective with more to say on 
inequality.  Although in its pure form it does not take a principled stand against inequality, it 
will often criticise it on functional grounds.  It may be argued, for instance, that inequalities 
introduce inefficiencies such as low demand, due to the limited spending power of poorer 
classes in society, and that this makes events such as the Crisis and the associated political 
instabilities predictable phenomena.
47
  Market innovations which stave off such crises – e.g. 
the making available of credit to those on low incomes – are regarded in this view as simply 
exacerbating the crash when it comes.  Adhesion to an economic doctrine which denied such 
realities is presented as one of the contributing factors to the Crisis.  As we see, this position 
need not be wholly hostile to the market, but it is in no way indifferent to inequality, tending to 
treat this as a public good.  It would seem to be a position of the Left. 
Finally, Box 4 (Injustice / Adhesion) would likewise seem to be a leftist position.  It is 
attuned to how existing structures systematically produce inequalities deemed normatively 
unacceptable.  Again, commitment to an ideology which neglects this is seen to accentuate 
injustice.  This perspective is not, to be sure, based on the thought that all inequalities are 
unjust, but that unacceptably large inequalities are systematically generated under the current 
arrangement.  The political parties and social movements with whom it is generally associated 
are conventionally associated with the Left – albeit not all of those conventionally so 
positioned adopt this discourse, or adopt this discourse alone.  
 
One concludes that the major divisions of opinion produced by the Crisis can be read in 
Left-Right terms.  They express variations on older Left-Right themes, refracted through the 
prism of diagnosing the nature and origins of the Crisis.  Specifically, the adhesion-
transgression distinction we have described points to diverging evaluations of the market 
model towards which the pre-Crisis order could be seen – both by advocates and critics – as 
tending, and towards which the post-Crisis order might continue to move.  We shall shortly 
complexify this observation, but for the moment it can be said that a Left-Right division of 
some sort is evident. 
If this is so, it would seem to mark a deviation from the period immediately preceding 
the Crisis.  In one line of argument, presented forcefully by sociologists in particular, Left and 
Right had ceased to be live and meaningful traditions by the beginning of the new millennium, 
lingering merely as old-fashioned labels.  The divisions of the day were petty and unprincipled 
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– to hunt foxes or to fox hunters, as it seemed in Britain – and had little or nothing to do with 
the great questions on which Left and Right had traditionally been divided.  While some 
figures at the margins might fight the old battles, they were but an eccentric few.  As divisions 
of opinion with mass resonance, Left and Right were exhausted.
48
  The differences of 
viewpoint we have recorded go some way to questioning this interpretation, indicating that 
meaningful disagreements concerning inequality and the market remain possible in conducive 
circumstances. We see positions of the Left with a renewed focus on matters economic rather 
than cultural, and a lively debate on the Right concerning how best to extol the virtues of the 
market without merely producing an apology for the Crisis.  At the prompt of events, opinion 
polarises. 
This is not to say though that present-day Europe exhibits a sharp and simple Left-
Right opposition.  As we have suggested, the differences of diagnosis are more pronounced 
than those of advocacy. .Moreover, arguably one of the major tendencies of the period lies in 
the political decoupling of the communitarian Right from the neoliberal Right (boxes 2 and 1 
in our table).  This corresponds to a more general division between normative and technical 
perspectives which can be seen on both Left and Right, and which the Crisis seems to be 
promoting.  These are points examined further in the final section. 
 
 
The Political Challenge 
 
We have argued that the strands of opinion which have so far formed in response to the Crisis, 
as well as displaying a Left-Right complexion, divide according to whether they see the 
essence of the Crisis as the production of disorder or injustice.  The disorder-based approach is 
a technical one which seeks to side-step questions of value; the injustice-based one places these 
centre-stage.  How does this second line of difference fit with the Left-Right division observed, 
and with what political implications?  
One way to read the disorder/injustice opposition is as expressing a difference in 
intended audience.  One can fairly argue that one set of narratives is aimed primarily at experts, 
being expressed in a form and vocabulary impenetrable to most and glossing over quotidian 
concerns, while the other is targeted at a mass public.  A bifurcation of audience runs through 
the Left-Right scheme we have described, as reading our table along a vertical axis indicates.  
This is important because it is central to the political challenge facing movements and parties 
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in the coming years.  Certain internal divisions are likely to recur, while unexpected alignments 
may emerge or be imputed from afar. 
The disorder-centred diagnoses tend to be expressed in economic language and suppose 
a level of economic literacy in the addressee.  Such interventions appear mainly intended to 
influence various kinds of elite – market investors, ratings agencies and decision-makers in 
government and international institutions.  (This is clearest in the case of the rightist ‘austerity’ 
message, often presented explicitly by its proponents as necessary to ‘reassure the markets’; 
but in part it is true also of the leftist alternatives, insofar as these respond to doubts amongst 
market actors concerning the growth-generating capacities of the austerity programme.)  
Sometimes these messages seem intended to have a direct performative effect: the very fact 
that they are uttered by a speaker with decision-making authority can be expected to influence 
the behaviour of others.  Sometimes, for example when voiced by academics, they may be 
intended to persuade more indirectly.  Generally the intended audience is a specialised one 
however.  Such narratives are rarely used to rally the voting public.  If they are intended for 
public ears at all – and the austerity programme does have its public face – one may speculate 
that it is rather to de-mobilise the public, couching decisions in an inscrutable language so that 
they carry an air of inevitability, are weakly susceptible to public criticism, and are seen as 
properly the business of elites.  It is a risky strategy, of course, since messages which foster 
public disengagement may in the longer run create the appetite for things more spicy. 
The injustice-centred diagnoses by contrast seem designed to carry mass appeal.  By 
focusing on the wrongs which the Crisis produces, and not just the inefficiencies, they 
introduce a note of passion.  Both in their leftist and rightist manifestations, they have a 
populist streak to them, articulating interests said to be general (those of the people, the 
majority, the public, the ‘99%’) in contrast to the vested interests of an elite.  They are also at 
least minimally democratic, being grounded in the assumption that decision-making needs 
normative justification and cannot simply refer to unarguable system requirements.  These 
critical tendencies are informed by the perception that public opinion is increasingly hostile to 
policies introduced by diktat as necessary responses to system imperatives.  They are attempts 
to articulate and shape genuine dissatisfactions.  Those parties which express such arguments 
in an unadulterated form – certain parties of Left and Right as highlighted – show evident 
capacity for mass mobilisation, as the Greek elections of Spring 2012 made clear.
49
 
The division between technical and normative discourses that runs through the Left-
Right scheme is one of its characteristic features today.  The Crisis coinciding with, and partly 
a result of, the extreme complexity of today’s economic system, the opinions it has generated 
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are marked by their embrace of complexity or refusal of it.  On the Left, this internal division is 
soft (prescriptive ideas recur across the two clusters),
50
 but on the Right it is pronounced – 
most likely because the neoliberal position (1) has widely been viewed as institutionally 
hegemonic and therefore a more urgent target for differentiation.  At the level of practical 
politics, this technical-normative split creates major challenges for many parties, especially 
those formed before the Crisis and those with aspirations to hold office, as they seek ways of 
combining both discourses.  The need to balance a technical emphasis on restoring system 
order (to gain ‘credibility’ with the relevant market and institutional actors) with a normative 
regard for justice (to achieve a level of public support in elections and the media) may produce 
intra-party divisions, as visible in many European Conservative, Christian Democratic and 
(especially Third-Way) Social Democratic parties.  It may produce sharp shifts in policy 
emphasis over the electoral cycle, as parties in an election campaign gesture towards normative 
commitments they have little intention of adhering to later.
51
  This dislocation between the 
technical and the normative can be seen as the ideological expression of what party scholars 
have termed the gap between ‘responsibility’ and ‘responsiveness’.52  The recruitment of 
experts who can speak technical discourses may produce divisions with those members and 
supporters for whom questions of principle should remain to the fore.  Many parties do not fit 
exclusively into one box in our table, in other words – and in the post-Crisis world this is one 
of their major challenges.  Those who can be assigned fairly straightforwardly – including 
certain pro-austerity parties, nationalist parties and socialist parties – are the ones which can 
hope to win the support of the market or the public, even if not both. 
Focusing on this technical/normative division running vertically through the table also 
sensitises us to some of the unexpected affinities and alliances to be found in contemporary 
political practice.  When commentators of the Right such as Moore suggest that ‘the Left might 
actually be right’, they express the sense of distance from the austerity programme which is 
common to injustice-focused perspectives of both Left and Right.  The political dominance of 
the former in the period immediately following the emergence of the Crisis has presented a 
common adversary.  Opposition to EU bailouts, both in ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’ countries, has 
produced similarly cross-cutting alliances of convenience.  Efforts to institutionalise the 
austerity programme in the form of the EU ‘fiscal compact’ (January 2012), if enduringly 
successful, are likely to create further commonalities of predicament between principle-based 
positions of Left and Right, as they are both kept at a distance from institutional power.  A 
major political axis would then pit technocratic administration against oppositions of principle 
of all shades.
53
  Clearly this would not obliterate the significance of the Left-Right divide – it 
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matters greatly whether the major opposition of principle is of the Left or Right – but it would 
obstruct its expression in institutional arenas.  It would also further encourage the existing 
tendency for these dissenting groups to be lumped together as one, by media commentators and 
political opponents alike, under headings such as ‘populism’ which minimise the important 
differences that exist.  
Let us note in addendum that the transnational dimensions of the Crisis add a further 
feature to the political challenge.  The political agendas associated with the positions we have 
described can be pursued to varying scopes.  They can be pursued at a European level or 
national level, as well as others more global or local.  This introduces potential disagreements 
within each of the strands of opinion, e.g. as socialists of a European and national orientation 
clash.  One might assume that some of these strands of opinion have a ‘natural’ scope implied 
in them: the right-wing Injustice / Transgression perspective might seem naturally a nationalist 
or regionalist one, given the degree of moral denunciation directed at foreign countries (e.g. 
Greece) and the scepticism towards the European Union.  Yet logically, all the Left and Right 
orientations we have discussed permit transnationalisation of their arguments.  Even 
mobilisations in the name of ‘the people’ are indeterminate in their scope, as they need not 
define ‘the people’ in ethno-culturalist or statist terms.  In many cases, the decision whether to 
adopt an integrationist or separatist approach is one primarily of strategy rather than principle.  
While nationalist, ethnicist or sovereigntist arguments may be appealed to, they are often 
secondary to a calculation of which level of engagement offers the best prospect of achieving 
goals of a Left-Right kind.
54
  Hence the scope for disagreement with parties and movements of 
the same orientation, and the political challenges of transnational coordination. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As we examine the strands of opinion which the Crisis of 2008- has produced, we find 
important distinctions concerning what makes it a crisis, what caused it, and – less markedly – 
how it may be overcome.  While the language of Left and Right is only sporadically invoked 
by actors themselves, the resultant divisions have a discernible Left-Right complexion, if we 
understand this to be a matter of views concerning the acceptability of inequality and the 
desirability of the market in its ideal form.  The distinction between accounts of the Crisis 
centred on transgression and adhesion is crucial in this respect.  Notions of ideological 
convergence and the obsolescence of the Left-Right scheme seem premature therefore.  Yet 
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one must talk of Lefts and Rights in the plural, with internal divisions between them.  Indeed, 
one of the transformative aspects of the Crisis seems to be the way it heightens some such 
divisions.  One sees new formations emerge in contra-distinction to positions on both sides of 
the divide, producing a line of division which runs perpendicular to the Left-Right axis.  In 
particular, while remaining quite distinct from positions of the Left, on the Right one sees the 
place of the market and the acceptability of inequality becoming a divisive issue – just as 1968 
and 1989 loosened the commitment of many leftists to a state-led economy.   
 In sum, the present moment appears to be a time of transition, one in which political ideas 
and the coalitions that accompany them show signs of being recast.  Gramsci’s famous notion 
of the ‘interregnum’ seems apposite,55 while a less familiar point of comparison might be the 
rite of passage:
56
  The Crisis may be thought of as a form of ritual, one that enables actors to 
take distance from old political identities and adopt new ones, at the same time within a 
framework of continuity.  Many political parties find themselves pulled in competing 
directions by these contending currents of opinion, and a period of volatility is the likely 
consequence. 
If political and socio-economic rupture acts as the spur to ideational differentiation, one 
may expect these divisions to stabilise, and ultimately fade, should the Crisis start to recede.  
The legacy of a world-historical event can be seen as the temporary fixing of those political 
views to which it gives definition, followed by their subsequent fracturing and the fading of the 
divisions produced.  How the Crisis will recede, and in particular who has the authority to 
declare that it has done so, remain unclear at the time of writing.  For now and for an indefinite 
period, we see the moving silhouettes of political discord. 
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